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Abstract 
 
Kazemi, A. (2006). Distributive preferences in social dilemmas. Department of Psychology, Göteborg 
University, Sweden. 
 
In research on social dilemmas and in game theoretic research, it was for a long time assumed that the 
rational decision is to choose an option with the most beneficial economic outcome to oneself. Yet, in 
group situations, individuals’ decisions have been shown to be influenced by non-economic motives. This 
dissertation starts from two premises: (i) in contrast to previous research positing maximization of 
economic benefits to oneself as the ultimate goal, it is argued that non-economic group goals (e.g., group 
performance, harmony, a sense of responsibility and social concern) favoring the collective interest are also 
important motives, and (ii) public good dilemmas can be decomposed into provision and allocation of the 
public good. Public good allocation has been largely neglected in previous research. Thus, the main 
question posed in this dissertation is whether people’s preferred allocations of a public good are related to 
the particular goal that the group pursues. In Study I, Experiment 1 revealed that fairness was related to 
how participants allocated the public good. Equity and equal final outcomes were more preferred than 
equality in the allocation of the public good. Inducing group goal in Experiment 2 proved to be effective in 
differentiating between the preferences for equity and equal final outcomes. Specifically, the goal of 
economic productivity resulted in equitable public good allocations and the goal of harmony resulted in 
allocations according to equal final outcomes. Equality was also preferred but only when it was conducive 
to realizing the goal of social concern. Study II tested the prediction that fairness and salience of a group 
goal would promote unselfish allocations of a public good. In support of this, Experiment 1 revealed no 
significant effects of self-interest on perceived instrumentality of allocation principles in fulfilling a certain 
group goal. Instead, instrumentality was related to perceived fairness. In Experiment 2, the group goal of 
economic productivity increased fairness of equitable public good allocations and the group goals of 
harmony and social concern increased fairness of equal public good allocations. Self-interest had no 
effects. In contrast to Studies I and II, Study III used an asymmetric public good dilemma paradigm in 
which participants had unequal endowments but provided evidence for similar effects of group goal on 
allocation preferences. Self-interest had no significant effects. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
fairness mediates the effect of group goal on allocation preferences, indicating that perceived fairness 
explains why people pursuing a certain group goal tend to prefer a specific allocation. In Study IV, 
Experiment 1 posed the question as to whether group goal also would account for allocation of negative 
outcomes. A factor analysis revealed a two-factor structure splitting group goal into relationship-oriented 
and performance-oriented goals. The former correlated with preferences for equal allocations, the latter 
with equitable allocations. Effects of group goal on allocation preferences were similar for distribution of 
positive and negative outcomes. Experiment 1 also revealed larger deviations from all distributive 
principles in allocation of negative outcomes. Further investigation of this result in Experiment 2 showed 
that as hypothesized allocations of negative outcomes were perceived as more difficult than allocations of 
positive outcomes, suggesting that in allocating negative outcomes people may experience a lower level of 
confidence in their allocations. 
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IV. Kazemi, A., & Eek, D. (in press). Effects of group goal and resource 
valence on allocation preferences in public good dilemmas. Social 
Behavior and Personality: An International Journal. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Believe those who seek the truth, doubt 
those who find it.” 
 
Andre Gide 
 
 
  
Acknowledgments 
 
The present work is the result of four years of devoted and hard work. It 
is without any doubt the biggest accomplishment in my life thus far. 
However, this work would never have been realized without contributions of 
other people. Now comes the time for me to reciprocate the many kindnesses 
that I have received during the time I have been working on this doctoral 
thesis. 
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor 
Tommy Gärling whose supervision has had a substantial bearing on my 
scientific attitude. He has acted as the devil’s advocate for many of my semi-
formed ideas and provided me with fast and constructive feedback. I am also 
indebted to my friend and assistant supervisor Associate Professor Daniel 
Eek who made me interested in this research area and who has provided 
valuable academic guidance and moral support during the last four years. I 
also wish to thank Professor Anders Biel and Associate Professor Mathias 
Gustafsson for reading and commenting on earlier versions of the 
manuscripts.  
I want also to thank Associate Professor Torun Lindholm for her 
professional evaluation of my doctoral thesis. 
For other contributions to this thesis, I would like to express my deepest 
gratitude to Professor Kjell Törnblom who encouraged and supported me to 
apply to graduate school and who always has been a good friend and a 
source of inspiration to me. Kjell, thanks also for careful reading of my 
thesis and your acute suggestions. Thanks are also due to Professors 
Elizabeth Mannix and James Meindl for providing me with materials on 
their studies; Morton Deutsch who provided valuable insights in planning 
the first experiment and commenting on Study I; and Riel Vermunt for 
careful reading and commenting on Study I. Thanks are also due to David 
Messick and Mark Weber for their suggestions at the 11th International 
Conference on Social Dilemmas (ICSD) in Krakow. 
I am grateful to Dr. Lars-Olof Johansson and fil. lic. Lars Olsson and 
other members of RUSEDA. Special credits go also to the administrative 
staff for support in matters of practical nature: Ann Backlund, Kjell 
Söderberg, Eva Gunne, and Marie Lomberg.   
For their friendship and for being good colleagues, I am also thankful to 
Dr. Tomas Ståhl, Elisabeth Olofsson, Ingvar Karlsson, Karin Kronberg and 
Björn Nilsson at University of Skövde. Thanks are also due to Katarina 
Östling at the university library for her invaluable kindnesses over the last 
years.  
I am deeply grateful to my mother (Farideh) who has devoted her life to 
my success and happiness. Dear mother, I hope that this work is the answer 
to all your efforts and concerns for me. You are the one who gives meaning 
to this work. I also acknowledge my debts to my father (Mohsen) who has 
been a role model in many respects. His talks about VIP’s have made many 
dreams, including this one, come true.  
A billion thanks to my beloved wife (Sheri) without whom this work 
would never have been realized. Sheri, thanks for your encouragement, 
enthusiasm, and unassailable support over the years. Your loyalty is a 
priceless gift from heaven. So is also your cooking skill!  
Finally, loud thanks are directed toward relatives and friends in Sweden 
and Iran who have provided moral support during the last years. I love you 
all!   
This research was financially supported by grant #421-2001-4697 to 
Daniel Eek from the Swedish Research Council.  
 
 
Göteborg, November 2006 
Ali Kazemi 
Contents 
 
Introduction 15 
Two-Party and N-Party Prisoner’s Dilemmas 17
 Experimental Paradigms in Social Dilemma Research 18 
 Promoting Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 19 
Social Justice 22 
Fairness in Social Dilemmas 24 
 Distributive Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 25 
 Procedural Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 29 
 Explaining the Importance of Fairness in Social Dilemmas 30 
Summary of Empirical Studies 31 
 Aims and Hypotheses 31 
 Study I 34 
 Study II 36 
 Study III 38 
 Study IV 40 
Discussion and Conclusions 43 
References 50 
Appendix 59 
 
Introduction  
 
In everyday life people often encounter situations where their personal 
interests are at odds with the welfare of a larger collective to which they 
belong. What seems to be an individually rational choice may have 
detrimental effects on the well-being of the group. Such conflicts of interest 
are referred to as social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). They are formally defined 
as follows: (i) individual outcomes for non-cooperative behavior or 
defection are larger than outcomes for cooperative behavior (favoring the 
collective interest), regardless of how other members in a collective behave; 
but (ii) if all members adhere to this individually rational behavior, all 
members will acquire a lower payoff as compared to if all had chosen to 
cooperate in the first place. 
The theoretical framework in research on decision making in social 
dilemmas was for a long time expected utility or rational choice theory (e.g., 
Camerer, 1990). According to this theory, people should choose the option 
with the largest expected utility. Thus, the rational (or dominant) decision in 
a social dilemma is always to defect (e.g., Dawes, 1980), that is, to benefit 
the own interest. However, the idea that economic incentives are the primary 
drivers of choice has been shown to be a too limited perspective (e.g., 
Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Instead, in order to understand decision making in 
social dilemmas, modern theorizing in psychology has adopted a multiple-
motives approach in which both economic and non-economic motives are 
argued to influence choice (e.g., De Cremer, 2002; Kerr, 1995; Tyler & 
Degoey, 1995). The present thesis adopts this approach and focuses in 
particular on an important non-economic motive (i.e., group goal) that has 
received scarce and scattered attention in previous research, and addresses 
its role for resource allocation while simultaneously considering the roles of 
distributive fairness norms1 and self-interest.  
The proposal that group goal affects allocation preferences is derived 
from Deutsch (1975, 1985) who suggested that norms of allocation are not 
adopted because of an intrinsic justice value but because of the goals they 
realize. Thus, the equity principle functions to maintain group productivity, 
the equality principle functions to maintain harmony and solidarity, and the 
need principle functions to maintain personal welfare and social concern in a 
                                                 
1 Theoretical and empirical research has focused on three potential allocation or distributive justice 
principles: equality, equity, and need (e.g., Deutsch, 1975, 1985). Equality refers to that individuals receive 
the same rewards regardless of possible individual differences. Equity, also referred to as the merit or 
proportionality rule, implies that the outcome received by the individual is proportional to his or her 
contribution of effort, ability, performance, etc. (e.g., Adams, 1965). The principle of need prescribes that 
the outcome is proportional to need. 
 15
group. In a related vein, Hochschild (1981) distinguished between three 
domains of life: the social domain of family, school, and neighborhood; the 
political domain of authority, rights, and taxes; and the economic domain of 
work, markets, and material goods. In her studies of a heterogeneous 
population in America, she concluded that Americans prefer to use equality 
when dealing with issues relevant to the social and political domains, 
whereas equity is used in the economic domain (for a similar line of 
reasoning, see Lane, 1986). 
Furthermore, it has been found that equality is endorsed when maximal 
mutual satisfaction is in focus, whereas the need principle is endorsed when 
justice is in focus (e.g., Lamm & Schwinger, 1983). Leventhal, Michaels, 
and Sanford (1972) observed that instructions to prevent interpersonal 
conflicts and dissatisfaction within a group resulted in equal distributions to 
group members who had contributed different amounts to realize a monetary 
group reward. Similarly, an emphasis on partnership and team membership 
(or mutuality) led participants to overlook differences in inputs resulting in a 
preference for the equality principle in allocation of a group reward. This 
was true whether the participants were affected by the allocation or were 
third-party non-recipient allocators (Lerner, 1974). As is evident, there is 
some support for the proposition that goals affect resource allocation, but the 
evidence is indirect and scattered. Thus, the principal aim of the present 
thesis is to more systematically examine the effects of group goal on 
resource allocation. 
Whereas previous social dilemma research has investigated the 
antecedents of cooperation in terms of public good provision, the present 
thesis focuses on antecedents of cooperation in terms of public good 
allocation. Thus, in effect, the present research conceptualizes cooperation 
broader than traditionally. Markóczy (2004) defined cooperation as joint 
behavior directed towards a goal in which members of a collective have a 
common interest. Similarly, Batson (1994) discussed cooperation in terms of 
“acting for the public good.” Kazemi and Eek (in press) posited that people 
realize different group goals by following appropriate norms of fairness for 
resource allocation. Viewed in this way, an allocation satisfying a certain 
group goal can be regarded as a cooperative behavior in the sense that the 
individual disregards own interests by helping the group to fulfill a certain 
collective goal. 
In the following section previous theoretical work and empirical 
research on social dilemmas are outlined. Thereafter, research on social 
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justice2 and the role of fairness in social dilemmas will be reviewed. 
Subsequently, a brief summary of the four studies on which the present 
thesis is based will be presented. Finally, in the last section the main results 
are considered with reference to the objectives of the thesis. Some attempts 
are also made to advance theoretical and practical implications of the present 
research.  
 
 
Two-Party and N-Party Prisoner’s Dilemmas 
 
Conflicts are integral to all kinds of social interaction. A thorough 
understanding of conflicts is important because of its substantial impact on 
the welfare of individuals and societies (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Levine & 
Thompson, 1996). In conflicts of interest inherent in mixed-motive 
situations, individuals are motivated both to cooperate and to compete with 
one another. As opposed to zero-sum games in which the sum of gains for 
the involved parties is fixed (i.e., the more one party acquires, the less the 
other party benefits) the sum of the gains for both parties is not constant in 
non-zero sum games. Thus, some outcomes are better for both than other 
outcomes. In addition, each person’s individual outcomes are determined by 
the actions of other group members (Komorita & Parks, 1995). 
The bulk of the early work on mixed-motive situations dealt with the 
two-person prisoner’s dilemma game. The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) 
derived its name from a hypothetical situation investigated by game theorists 
(Luce & Raiffa, 1957). Imagine that a district attorney has summoned two 
suspects. Although the attorney is certain that these two suspects are guilty 
of robbery, he cannot prove it. The two suspects are questioned in two 
separate rooms. They are then presented with two options: confess to the 
crime (i.e., defection, D) or remain silent (i.e., cooperation, C). According to 
the prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix, confessing is a dominant strategy for 
each suspect as it renders a better outcome than not confessing. Adopted by 
both (D/D), this strategy gives each a sentence of ten years. However, a 
better outcome, two years, arises if neither confesses (C/C). The former 
outcome is in equilibrium in the sense that no one has an incentive to change 
his or her behavior. It is however deficient because there is another outcome 
that leads to more benefits to all. The prisoner’s dilemma is formally defined 
as such if two conditions are satisfied: (1) non-cooperation is more 
beneficial for each player than cooperation regardless of the other player’s 
                                                 
2 The following terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis: (a) justice and fairness, and (b) 
distributive/distribution and outcome. 
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choice; (2) mutual cooperation is better than mutual non-cooperation (i.e., 
D/C > C/C > D/D > C/D). 
Although in the past the two-person PDG was the most frequently used 
paradigm in mixed-motive interaction research, the attention has more 
recently turned to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma or social dilemma 
(Komorita & Parks, 1995). A two-person prisoner’s dilemma differs from a 
social dilemma in various respects. For instance, the negative effects 
resulting from defection in social dilemmas involve many people whereas 
defection in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma only affects the other 
individual. Moreover, identifying defectors is more difficult in social 
dilemmas because many others are involved (Dawes, 1980). 
 
Experimental Paradigms in Social Dilemma Research 
Social dilemmas can be categorized in a number of ways (e.g., 
Komorita & Parks, 1994). A distinction is usually made with regard to the 
focus of the dilemma, whether harvesting from a common resource or 
contributing to a common good. Resource dilemmas refer to situations where 
each individual has to decide how much to harvest from a common resource 
that he or she has free access to. Since the resource is scarce, the harvests 
must be constrained in order to prevent depletion of the resource. In a typical 
resource dilemma experiment each individual is allowed to take from a 
collective resource once or on successive trials. Participants are informed 
that they can keep their harvests, usually points exchangeable to money, as 
long as the total amount harvested by the whole group does not exceed the 
size of the pool or the replenishment rate of the pool. Every individual has to 
use the common resource efficiently at the same time that he or she has to 
ensure personal payoff. The outcome structure reflects a social dilemma in 
the sense that it is in the interest of each individual to maximize his or her 
harvests but if all adopt this strategy the common resource will be depleted.  
Public good dilemmas are situations where individuals through 
contributions can realize a common resource from which the whole group 
can benefit. Participants in experiments employing this paradigm are 
instructed to contribute some or all of their endowments (i.e., to cooperate) 
in order to establish a common resource or to keep them (i.e., to defect). The 
endowments contributed to the public good are multiplied by a constant 
larger than one. This means that the value of the contributed endowment is 
larger than the value of a non-contributed endowment. The risk that all 
contributing individuals take is that other members may free ride on their 
contributions. More specifically, once the common good is established, 
every group member can benefit, regardless of his or her contributions. The 
 18
temptation of non-cooperation stems from the impossibility of exclusion 
(Olson, 1965). Public goods are also characterized by the feature of non-
rivalry, that is, one individual’s use of the good does not reduce its 
availability to another individual (Cornes & Sandler, 1996).  
A distinction is made between two different types of public goods (PG), 
that is, continuous or step-level PG dilemmas pertaining to the relation 
between input and outcome. In a step-level PG dilemma, where a specific 
threshold or provision point is set, contributions beyond it have no further 
impact on the final outcome. Thus, the outcome in such a dilemma is 
dichotomous in that the PG is either provided or not. Therefore, it is 
sometimes called a binary or discrete PG dilemma (Rapoport, 1987). In 
continuous PG dilemmas (Komorita & Parks, 1994), better collective 
outcomes are reached as a function of increased contributions. A similar 
distinction is made between dilemmas where the individual choice is either 
discrete or continuous. Thus, group members either choose between 
cooperation and defection or between defection and different degrees of 
cooperation.  
Moreover, there is a distinction between symmetric and asymmetric 
social dilemmas. Symmetry or asymmetry may exist with regard to the 
number of endowments (i.e., initial assets) participants have in public good 
dilemmas or access to the common resource in resource dilemmas. 
Specifically, in symmetric public good dilemmas all participants have the 
same number of endowments and in symmetric resource dilemmas 
participants have equal access to the common resource. In asymmetric social 
dilemmas there is an initial inequality with regard to the participants’ 
cooperation ability (i.e., endowments and access).  
Furthermore, one can classify social dilemmas according to whether 
participants make their decisions simultaneously or in a sequence (Budescu, 
Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1992). In a sequential protocol, all participants are 
notified about their position in the contribution or harvest sequence as well 
as about earlier harvests or contributions. However, most experimental 
studies of social dilemmas have utilized a simultaneous protocol, where 
participants make their harvests or contributions simultaneously.  
Finally, social dilemmas may be one-shot or repeated (multi-trial). In 
one-shot social dilemmas players contribute or harvest only once, whereas in 
multi-trial social dilemmas players make their choices repeatedly.  
 
Promoting Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 
Ever since the seminal work by Hardin (1968), social psychologists 
along with scientists from other disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, and 
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political science) have investigated cognitions and behavior in social 
dilemmas. A great deal of research effort has been devoted to identifying 
and examining the factors influencing cooperation. The most important 
factors and their effects on cooperation are briefly outlined below.  
Cooperation increases with decreasing group size (e.g., Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975; Van Lange et al., 1992). 
Differences in group size between small groups seem to be more crucial than 
corresponding size differences between large groups, largely due to the fact 
that psychological factors that impair cooperation reach a ceiling. A number 
of explanations have been offered for the group size effect. One explanation 
advanced by Jorgenson and Papciak (1981) is known as the efficacy-
cooperation hypothesis according to which people are more prone to 
cooperate in smaller groups because they then believe that their cooperation 
will have a bearing on the outcome. In support of this hypothesis, Kerr 
(1989) found that perceived efficacy increased as group size decreased, even 
when objective efficacy was held constant. Another explanation that has 
been proposed, called the de-individuation hypothesis (Hamburger, Guyer, 
& Fox, 1975), suggests that anonymity is the mechanism through which 
group size affects cooperation rate. As the group size increases, individual 
actions become less salient, resulting in free riding that is not detected and 
punished.  
Related to group size effects is the positive impact of communication 
(e.g., Dawes et al., 1977). Dawes et al. (1977) investigated the effects of four 
levels of communication (i.e., no communication vs. game-irrelevant 
communication vs. game-relevant communication vs. game-relevant 
communication along with non-binding public commitments prior to each 
trial) on cooperation. Cooperation rates reached 30 % and 32 % in the first 
two conditions, respectively, whereas the last two generated reliably higher 
rates of 72 % and 71 %, respectively. This was in support of the notion that 
relevant communication matters irrespective of public announcements that 
can be broken. The communication effect highlights the fact that it is the 
discussion of the dilemma (i.e., game-relevant communication) as such 
rather than getting acquainted with other group members that promotes 
cooperation. Several explanations have been advanced for the 
communication effect. However, research suggests that there are only two 
tenable accounts (Van Lange et al., 1992). First, communication promotes 
cooperation by triggering a sense of commitment to the group (Chen & 
Komorita, 1994; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Second, communication 
enhances cooperation by heightening group identity and solidarity among 
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group members (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Orbell, Van de Kragt, & Dawes, 
1988). 
People’s propensity to act in line with the collective interest is also 
influenced by knowledge of others’ behavior (Dawes et al., 1977; Parks, 
Sanna, & Berel, 2001; Wit & Wilke, 1998). Messick, Allison, and 
Samuelson (1988) advanced the concepts of social and environmental 
uncertainty in the study of social dilemmas. Social uncertainty refers to the 
lack of knowledge about others’ choices (i.e., cooperation or defection), 
while environmental uncertainty refers to the vagueness of the defining 
features of a specific dilemma. The notion of uncertainty in social dilemma 
research draws on Festinger’s social comparison theory (e.g., Wit & Wilke, 
1998). According to Festinger (1954a, 1954b) people are motivated to 
evaluate their opinions and abilities, because they want to have informed 
ideas about the world they live in. This is best accomplished by comparison 
against direct and physical standards. However, when such standards are not 
available, there is a strong tendency to compare oneself with similar others. 
Research suggests that people are less cooperative with increasing social and 
environmental uncertainty3 (e.g., Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999; 
Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 1992; Sawyer, 1990; Sniezek, May, & 
Sawyer, 1990). 
Finally, individual differences in how people evaluate outcomes for 
themselves and others in interdependent situations usually referred to as 
social value orientations affect cooperative behavior in social dilemmas 
(Eek & Gärling, 2006; McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Van Lange, 1999). Social value orientation refers to a stable personal 
characteristic that affects choices with interdependent outcomes. 
Specifically, social value orientation has been defined as preferences for 
distributions of resources between self and others. Three social value 
orientations are usually discussed in the literature. Cooperators try to achieve 
equal outcomes between the involved parties. Competitors maximize their 
relative advantage in outcome, while Individualists tend to maximize their 
own outcome regardless of outcomes to others. People with a cooperative 
social value orientation are referred to as pro-socials, whereas those having 
either a competitive or individualistic social value orientation are referred to 
as pro-selfs. Individuals with individualistic or competitive social value 
orientations have been found to be less cooperative in social dilemma 
                                                 
3 However, there is some research showing that uncertainty does not always lead to less cooperation (e.g., 
Van Dijk et al., 1999). 
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experiments than individuals with a cooperative social value orientation 
(e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989). 
 
 
Social Justice 
 
Research on relative deprivation (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, 
& Williams, 1949) during the period following the World War II can be 
regarded as the starting point for more systematic inquiries of social justice 
in social psychology. According to the theory of relative deprivation 
(Crosby, 1976), a sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is socially regulated 
through comparison processes in which a subjectively perceived outcome is 
compared to some kind of external standard. In other words, the objective 
quality of the outcomes does not always decide the level of personal 
gratification. Crosby (1976) suggested that deprivation is related to feelings 
of resentment, and in order to feel resentment, five conditions must be 
fulfilled. The individual who lacks something (X) must: (1) perceive that 
another individual possesses X, (2) have a desire for possessing X, (3) feel 
entitled to possess X, (4) consider coming into possession of X as feasible, 
and (5) not feel responsible for lacking X.  
One of the origins of social justice theory and research is to be found in 
the insights of relative deprivation theory insofar as justice studies aim at 
understanding people’s subjective perception of justice and place the 
emphasis on social comparisons. Relative deprivation studies demonstrate 
that when people compare their outcomes with those of others, they usually 
employ standards of entitlement and deservingness4. Such criteria are 
closely related to what people think is fair. Thus, as we make justice 
judgments we are involved in comparison processes and the criteria of 
comparisons utilized are principles of justice. There are three general and 
widely agreed upon type of justice judgments: distributive, procedural, and 
retributive (Tyler & Smith, 1998). A fourth type has been proposed, referred 
to as interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986). Although the present thesis 
exclusively focuses on distributive justice, research and theory primarily 
related to other types of justice is described in order to provide the reader 
with a broader theoretical context in which this thesis can be placed. 
The first framework guiding distributive justice research was equity 
theory (e.g., Adams, 1965), according to which people infer fairness by 
                                                 
4 Most scholars in the area make a distinction between relative deprivation and injustice in that the former 
results from a discrepancy between reality and preferences, while feelings of injustice result from a 
discrepancy between reality and perceived entitlements (Törnblom, 1992).  
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examining the ratio of their own inputs relevant to their outcomes and then 
comparing this ratio to the input-to-outcome ratio of a referent (i.e., similar) 
other. Put differently, for fairness to prevail, the equity principle demands 
outcomes to be proportional to contributions. However, as Deutsch (1975) 
and several others (e.g., Leventhal, 1976; Mikula, 1980; Reis, 1984) noted, 
the equity theory was too limited to encompass the variety of people’s 
justice judgments. Deutsch (1975) suggested a multiple-principles approach 
to distributive justice assuming that eleven values define justice in different 
allocation situations. Deutsch then reduced these to the three general 
principles of equity, equality, and need. A large number of studies have been 
conducted to understand why people frequently disagree about which 
principle should represent justice in a given context, and why a person may 
define justice in terms of a certain principle in one situation at one point in 
time, while at another point in time and/or in another situation a different 
principle is viewed as the appropriate representation of justice. Several of 
the factors that have been shown to affect people’s justice conceptions were 
grouped into six general categories in Törnblom (1992): (1) characteristics 
of the actor, (2) the contribution, (3) the social relationship, (4) the socio-
cultural and historical context, (5) the outcome, and (6) the outcome 
allocation.  
While distributive justice is concerned with perceived fairness of 
outcomes, procedural justice research is concerned with perceived fairness 
of the decision procedures leading to the outcomes. The latter line of 
research was initiated by the seminal work of Thibaut and Walker (1975) in 
which they compared the adversarial to the inquisitorial procedures for 
dispute resolution and investigated when and why people go to third-parties. 
Thibaut and Walker (1975) argued that distribution of control among 
disputants and third-party decision makers is the critical feature that 
influences people’s perceived fairness of procedures. They proposed two 
types of control: process control and decision control. Process control refers 
to disputants’ opportunity to present evidence and other case relevant 
information. Decision control refers to disputants’ influence over the actual 
outcomes. According to the instrumental or control model of justice 
proposed by Thibaut and Walker (1975), people in general prefer having 
direct control over their outcomes (i.e., decision control) in interactions with 
others. However, such control is not feasible in many social situations. 
Therefore, in order to ensure fair outcomes, people pursue process control 
through which they can express their view to the deciding authority and 
thereby expect to influence the authority towards their own sense of what is 
right. However, the explanation of the instrumental model is confined to a 
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concern for outcomes. That is, process control is important to people insofar 
as it can lead to fair outcomes. Lind and Tyler (1988) developed the group-
value model as an alternative to account for fair treatment effects. This 
model posits that people care about fair treatment because the fairness of 
procedures carries information about an individual’s status as a member of 
the group. This account derives from the assumption that the group is 
fundamental to human life and that experiences from groups to which people 
belong shape the view they hold of themselves (e.g., self-worth). The group-
value model was extended to the relational model of authority (Tyler & 
Lind, 1992) in which the antecedents of support for authorities and rules are 
addressed. Both the group-value model and the relational model of authority 
maintain that judgments of fair treatment are relational in character and that 
the issues of neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition are central to 
understanding fairness. 
As opposed to the focus of procedural justice research on formal 
procedures, interactional justice (Bies and Moag, 1986) refers to fairness 
associated with the interpersonal treatment received during the enactment of 
decision making procedures. The criteria for deciding whether an individual 
perceives allocation events as interactionally fair are: politeness, niceness, 
respect, and adequate explanations. There is, however, some controversy 
concerning whether interactional justice should be subsumed under the 
broader concept of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Bies, 
1990). 
Retributive justice (e.g., Brickman, 1977) is concerned with rule 
violation and the severity of sanctions for norm-breaking conduct. It is 
related to equity-based distributive justice in that victims of rule-breaking 
behavior are compensated for material losses in order for equity to be 
restored. However, retributive concerns cannot be equated with equity-
restoration efforts. In support of this, Horai (1977) showed that those who 
intentionally had broken rules without causing any harm were punished 
more severely than those who unintentionally had caused some harm. Thus, 
the question is on what basis people decide whether someone should be 
punished for rule-breaking conduct. The most important criterion has been 
shown to be attribution of responsibility and blame (Shaver, 1985). 
 
 
Fairness in Social Dilemmas 
 
Social dilemma research has during the last four decades highlighted 
the role of cooperation for a functional society (e.g., Messick & Brewer, 
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1983). As a consequence, this research has been predominantly concerned 
with identifying factors that promote cooperation and thereby increase the 
welfare of the group or society at large (for an overview, see Komorita & 
Parks, 1994). Notions about the role of fairness as a crucial factor for 
cooperation in social dilemmas emerged early (Marwell & Ames, 1979). 
Although this still is a relatively unexplored area, some significant work has 
been done during the last two decades. Combining the two fields of social 
justice and social dilemmas has proven to be fruitful as both are concerned 
with the two important issues of interdependency and self-interest (cf. Tyler 
& Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Degoey, 1995). More recently, De Cremer and Van 
Dijk (2003) and Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, and Bembenek (2003) 
emphasized the value of integrating research on justice, ethics, and decision 
making in research on social dilemmas. De Cremer and Van Dijk (2003) 
noted that research on decision making has increasingly taken into account 
the role of contextual factors, such as fairness, impacting on individual 
decision making. Similarly, Schroeder et al. (2003) argued that free riding 
awakes notions of fairness as it results in beneficial resource asymmetry for 
the free riders and sucker payoffs for the cooperators. 
 
Distributive Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 
Kerr (1995) discussed the role of three general interaction norms for 
cooperation in social dilemmas: commitment, reciprocity, and equity. 
Commitment refers to accomplishing what one has promised to do. 
Reciprocity pertains to returning a benefit of equal worth to the person that 
provided a benefit. The equity norm prescribes that distribution of benefits 
or harms should be based on the inputs or costs of people. In the case of 
equal inputs or costs, the equity norm coincides with the equality norm in 
that equal distributions are accomplished. As noted previously, two major 
paradigms have been employed in social dilemma research: resource 
dilemmas which refer to situations in which each group member decides 
how much to harvest from a common resource that he or she has free access 
to, and public good dilemmas which refer to situations in which group 
members, through individual contributions, provide a common resource 
from which all can benefit. I begin by discussing the role of distributive 
fairness in resource dilemmas and continue with public good dilemmas, 
ending this section by considering research that compares the two dilemma 
types with regard to distributive fairness conceptions. 
Fairness in Resource Dilemmas. Wilke, De Boer, and Liebrand (1986) 
reported that a majority of participants considered it fair that a person who 
had participated longer in an experiment should take more from the resource 
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than those who had participated shorter (i.e., equity). When no information 
was given about time invested by participants, no such effect was observed. 
In the Greed-Efficiency-Fairness (GEF) hypothesis, Wilke (1991) 
drawing on the work of Samuelson et al. (1986) proposed that people facing 
resource dilemmas are by nature greedy in the sense that they prioritize their 
personal gains before the welfare of others. However, as decades of research 
have indicated, despite the lack of knowledge about others’ choices or the 
size of the common pool, people do not make the dominant choice in social 
dilemmas (i.e., defection). In contrast, people often promote the collective 
interest at the expense of their own personal benefits. Wilke argued that 
although people are greedy, their greed is restrained by a motive to utilize 
the resource efficiently in preventing it from depleting and a desire to be fair 
in terms of ensuring that others have harvested an equal amount. Thus, a 
resource dilemma might be viewed as a coordination task in which 
individuals pursue outcome maximization within the constraints of not 
taking more than their fair share and that the common resource does not 
deplete. 
Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, and Bazerman (1996) compared symmetric 
(where people have equal access to the resource) and asymmetric resource 
dilemmas (unequal access) with regard to interpretations of fairness and 
harvesting behavior. They argued and found that the equality rule was 
conceived as fair in symmetric settings, whereas it was more difficult to 
decide what a fair allocation would be in asymmetric settings. 
Overharvesting (i.e., non-cooperation) was more frequently found in 
asymmetric than in symmetric resource dilemmas, suggesting that 
asymmetric resource dilemmas are more complex and thus lead to ambiguity 
in deciding what is fair. 
Fairness in Public Good Dilemmas. Marwell and Ames (1979) 
investigated people’s investment decisions. Participants were instructed to 
invest a certain amount of tokens either in a private good, in a public good, 
or in both types of goods. Investments in private goods returned a fixed 
amount of money per invested token while the public good returned money 
to the whole group, and above a certain provision threshold, more money per 
token than did investments in the private good. The results showed that high-
endowment participants, who were capable of providing the public good 
themselves without any contributions from low-endowment participants, 
contributed significantly more than did low-endowment participants (i.e., 
according to equity). Marwell and Ames interpreted this as participants 
behaved in a way they conceived as fair. Furthermore, a majority of 
participants considered investing half or more of their tokens as fair. 
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Joireman, Kuhlman, and Okuda (1994) investigated the role of internal 
versus external attributions of wealth for perceived fair contributions to self 
and others in an asymmetric step-level public good dilemma. They argued 
and found that people attributing resource asymmetries to internal factors 
thought that the poor should contribute a larger proportion of their assets 
than the rich. Those attributing differences in wealth to external factors 
considered equal contributions to be most fair. Own contributions and 
expectation about others’ contributions were found to be positively 
associated with fairness conceptions. 
Wit, Wilke, and Oppewal (1992) found that contributing in proportion 
to one’s assets or interest (profit) position was conceived as fair. 
Specifically, the more assets participants possessed, the more they felt 
obliged to contribute. Accordingly, the higher the individual’s profit 
position, the more he or she felt obliged to contribute. Wit et al. (1992) 
suggested that the relative cost of contributing one or more resource units is 
reduced the more assets one possesses, and that this was the basis of fairness 
concerns. 
In a related vein, Van Dijk and Grodzka (1992) investigated choice 
behavior in an asymmetric public good dilemma and compared a situation in 
which participants had knowledge about the distribution of endowments 
across the group members with a situation in which no such information was 
provided. In contrast to Wit et al.’s (1992) focus on the relative costs of 
contribution, Van Dijk and Grodzka focused on the final states of wealth 
possession, that is, an equitable allocation of the outcomes. Corroborating 
previous research, they found that the reported fair contribution was larger 
for high-endowment than for low-endowment participants. The results also 
indicated that those who were informed about the asymmetry were more 
motivated to reduce inequity. Furthermore, those who were not informed 
about the asymmetry displayed a stronger preference for the equality rule as 
compared to those who were informed. Extending this line of research, Van 
Dijk and Wilke (1993) addressed the role of equity concerns for public good 
provision where members of a group had differential interests. The results 
indicated that participants were more reluctant to reduce differences in final 
outcomes when efforts were asymmetric (the justified condition) than when 
efforts were symmetric (the unjustified condition). Van Dijk and Wilke 
concluded that high-interest people do not contribute more to the public 
good than low-interest people unless the asymmetry of interest is considered 
to be unjustified. Similarly, Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) suggested that 
people may be prompted to redistribute wealth by means of public good 
provision. In support of equity theory (Adams, 1965), differences in final 
 27
outcomes diminished in the case of equal time investments (the asymmetry 
unjustified condition) as compared to unequal time investments (the 
asymmetry justified condition). 
In another line of research, Biel, Eek, and Gärling (1997) found that 
parents’ willingness to pay for municipality child care was related to how 
fair the distribution of quality of child care was perceived. The results 
indicated that equality was perceived as the fairest principle for distribution 
and that parents were willing to pay the most when equality was prevalent. 
Eek, Biel, and Gärling (1998) replicated and extended these results in 
experiments where participants rated how fair they considered distributions 
of a public good (i.e., child care) according to the principles of equity, 
equality, and need. They found that perceived fairness of the public good’s 
distribution mediated the effect of allocation principle on contributions to 
the public good. Thus, fairness perceptions accounted for positive effects of 
endorsed allocation strategies on cooperation. Eek, Biel, and Gärling (2001) 
showed that the promoting impact of perceived fairness on cooperation 
extended to conditions where equity was considered as the fairest principle. 
Furthermore, equity was perceived as fairer for a privately provided child 
care, while equality was perceived as fairer under municipality child care.  
Comparing Fairness Conceptions in Resource and Public Good 
Dilemmas. Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) regarded fairness norms as 
coordination rules. They found that participants in the public good dilemma 
based their choices on the equity rule, and that participants in the resource 
dilemma based their choices on the equal final outcomes rule even though 
the objective payoff structure in both types of dilemma was identical. 
Extending this line of research, Van Dijk and Wilke (2000) advanced the 
notion of decision-induced focusing in order to explain why public good 
dilemmas elicit different choice behaviors than do resource dilemmas. This 
notion suggests that it is the behavior that is focused (e.g., giving some or 
keeping some of the endowments in a public good dilemma) and not the 
dilemma type per se that affect people’s fairness judgments and preferences. 
In order to test this notion, Van Dijk and Wilke (2000) introduced two 
dilemma types, that is, keep-some and leave-some dilemmas in addition to 
give-some and take-some dilemmas. Give-some and keep-some dilemmas 
were regarded as public good dilemmas, while take-some and leave-some 
dilemmas were regarded as resource dilemmas. Van Dijk and Wilke argued 
that if it is the dilemma type that elicits different choice behaviors, then one 
should expect a stronger preference for the equity rule in both give-some and 
keep-some dilemmas and a stronger preference for the equal final outcomes 
rule in take-some and leave-some dilemmas. However, in support of 
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decision-induced focusing, the give-some and leave-some dilemmas (i.e., 
low outcome focus) invoked a preference for the equity rule, whereas the 
keep-some and the take-some dilemmas (i.e., high outcome focus) invoked a 
stronger preference for the equal final outcomes rule. 
Van Dijk et al. (1999) investigated the role of fairness in coordinating 
choice behavior under environmental uncertainty in asymmetric social 
dilemmas. They argued that environmental uncertainty affects choice of 
coordination rule and that people would base their decisions on aspects of 
the dilemma that they are certain of. Specifically, the public good dilemma 
led people having no information about others’ endowments position (i.e., 
environmental uncertainty) to employ the equal contribution rule, while 
those having such information (i.e., environmental certainty) employed the 
equity rule. Fairness norms were regarded as coordination rules in that they 
tacitly coordinate choice behavior. Endorsement of these rules necessitated 
information about certain aspects of the situation. In a second experiment 
environmental uncertainty was induced by presenting a probability 
distribution to the participants. It was expected that people in the case of 
other tenable coordination rules would choose the coordination rule that was 
closest to the rule they prefer in a situation of environmental certainty. Thus, 
when information about resource size in a resource dilemma was certain, 
participants anchored their decisions on the equal final outcomes rule, 
whereas when the information about resource size was uncertain, 
participants anchored their decisions on the inverse proportionality rule. The 
inverse proportionality rule prescribed that members who received one-sixth 
of the bonus (i.e., low interest) should take twice as many chips as those who 
received one-third of the bonus (i.e., high interest). 
 
Procedural Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas 
Tyler and Degoey (1995) examined the role of procedural fairness for 
willingness to empower authorities and willingness to accept their decisions 
in a naturally occurring resource dilemma, the California water shortage in 
1991. Both empowerment of authorities and decision acceptance proved to 
be positively related to procedural fairness concerns. Effects of procedural 
fairness were mainly attributed to having benevolent relations with the 
authorities. In a related vein, De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002) 
reported that perceived procedural fairness of organizational leaders, as it 
appeals to relational concerns (Tyler & Lind, 1992), was positively 
correlated with participants’ willingness to cooperate. De Cremer (2002) 
investigated the effects of respect received from fellow group members on 
one’s willingness to contribute to provision of a public good. Derived from 
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the group-value model of justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988), it was suggested 
that respect conveys self-relevant relational information (i.e., being included 
and having status in the group). Respect was therefore assumed and found to 
strengthen people’s motivation to promote the collective interest. In support 
of this, De Cremer (2003) showed that feelings of belongingness mediated 
the effects of respect on contributions to a public good. 
 
Explaining the Importance of Fairness in Social Dilemmas 
Three lines of research integrating social justice and social dilemma 
research may be discerned. One line (e.g., Van Dijk et al., 1999; Wit et al., 
1992) initiated the idea of fairness as an important motive in social 
dilemmas, manifested through coordination rules such as equity and 
equality. In general, the effects of fairness on cooperation in this line of 
research are examined by first asking participants what they perceive as fair 
to take from or contribute to a collective resource, and then measure their 
actual harvests or contributions. Another line of research (e.g., Eek & Biel, 
2003; Eek et al., 1998, 2001) investigated the validity of the GEF hypothesis 
to account for cooperation in public good dilemmas, and examined, in 
particular, how fair people perceived different distributions of the public 
good to be, and how much they were willing to contribute to its 
maintenance. A third line of research (e.g., De Cremer, 2002, 2003; Tyler & 
Degoey, 1995) has investigated effects of procedural fairness on cooperation 
in social dilemmas. Thus, instead of targeting perceived fairness of final 
outcome distributions, this line of research examines the quality of the 
formal and informal aspects of the procedures enacted by authorities in 
making outcome decisions. 
Taken together, this research suggests that fairness guides cooperation 
and downplays the role of self-interest in social dilemmas where individuals 
find themselves entrapped between cooperative choices benefiting collective 
interests on one hand and competitive choices benefiting individual interests 
on the other. The question is why fairness plays such a paramount role for 
how people choose in social dilemmas. One answer is that fairness is a 
strong social norm. Norms are often defined as socially anchored 
expectations about proper conduct “enforced by the threat of sanctions or the 
promise of reward” (Kerr, 1995, p. 33). Thus, norms are widely shared and 
internalized through the process of socialization (Scott, 1971; Sherif, 1966). 
Fairness may also be important for self-presentational concerns. 
Distributions of scarce and positively valent resources confront involved 
parties with a motivational dilemma. On the one hand, they want to 
maximize their own gains. On the other hand, they strive for being perceived 
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as fair because fairness is seen as a moral virtue (cf. Folger, 1998). It has 
also been found that fair people are perceived as more trustworthy and 
reliable (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Tyler (2005) advanced the social value activation model positing that 
self-interest and outcome favorability have less impact on people’s 
behavioral decisions when actions are viewed in terms of social values (e.g., 
justice, morality). An implication is that if a justice frame is activated, 
people will exhibit fairness considerations. When this happens, people 
display high levels of decision acceptance and satisfaction without too much 
attention to gains and losses. If a justice frame is not triggered, decisions will 
primarily be based on self-interest concerns, that is, in terms of gains and 
losses. 
Moreover, to follow norms promotes collective action (e.g., Kerr, 
1995), in particular, when communication is not possible, as often is the case 
in social dilemma research. Hence, actions of interdependent individuals can 
tacitly be coordinated in an efficient way (e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995) 
when others realize each other’s motives, that is, by being fair they signal to 
others that they do not intend to take advantage of them. 
Finally, fairness has also been proposed by recent theorizing in 
procedural justice to be instrumental in managing uncertainty in social 
encounters. Uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002) 
posits that activation of fairness processes is an indication of fairness 
judgments being utilized to settle some important social or psychological 
issues. Lind and Van den Bos (2002) suggested that fairness serves people in 
managing uncertain situations by giving them “confidence that they will 
ultimately receive good outcomes and because it makes the possibility of 
loss less anxiety-provoking” (p. 195). 
 
 
Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
This thesis initiates a new line of research by extending the notion of 
collective interest in social dilemmas into a multiple collective goal notion 
(Deutsch, 1975, 1985). Specifically, it has generally been assumed that the 
primary goal in a social dilemma is to achieve the highest possible utility, 
often monetary in nature, for the individual or the collective (e.g., Kreps, 
1990). However, in many cases other goals, relational in nature, may be 
equally or even more important. For instance, members of a group may 
strive to foster future enjoyable social relations, a sense of responsibility, or 
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concern for others in a group. Hence, the extent to which one believes that 
different group goals are achieved affect how benefits are allocated to 
members of a group or how different allocations are perceived in terms of 
fairness.  
Deutsch (1975) argued that equity is associated with effectiveness and 
productivity. The rationale is that individuals performing better, contributing 
more, or possessing higher abilities will be entitled and legitimized to gain 
more of the collective’s resources. For instance, it may be argued that the 
capability of high-skilled individuals will eventually lead to an enlargement 
of the common wealth. In contrast, whenever enjoyable social relations and 
harmony are salient in a social relationship, the equality rule is most likely to 
be employed because it does not differentiate between the members of the 
collective and, therefore, reduces outbreaks of possible conflicts resulting 
from differential treatments. Equity is believed to impair enjoyable social 
relations, since it may signal unequal status or unequal worth of the group 
members. The need principle is endorsed in situations in which individuals’ 
welfare and a sense of social concern and responsibility for others are in 
focus. Since needs differ and needy individuals may have limited 
capabilities or opportunities to make contributions, allocations in accordance 
with equity would prove to be detrimental to the personal welfare and 
development of those in need. 
It is thus argued that group goals define desired future states that frame 
the allocation decision or provide a reason as to why a collective resource 
should be distributed according to one principle rather than another (cf. 
Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Pillutla and Chen (1999) showed that 
people cooperate more in social dilemmas involving non-economic 
decisions (i.e., contributing to a social event) than in those involving 
economic decisions (i.e., investing in a joint investment fund). Similarly, 
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) argued that the effect of sanctions on 
cooperation depends on the decision frame (i.e., business vs. ethical) 
invoked since it induces different processing. They found that a business 
frame triggers a calculative decision process whereby the strength of the 
sanction affects the extent to which people choose to cooperate, whereas an 
ethical frame triggers a non-calculative decision process leading to a 
cooperation heuristic that is unaffected by the strength of the sanction. 
Although these studies are relevant in that they are all concerned with 
decision frames and context-dependent decision making, they do not 
specifically address the issue of how allocation preferences vary with group 
goals. 
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The approach in the studies included in this thesis is more similar to 
Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft (1995) who asked participants to role-play as 
vice presidents of a private company and to distribute a number of 
instructional videos among three different company divisions that differed in 
terms of past performance. They systematically varied what they called 
culture (economically oriented, relationship oriented, and personal 
development oriented) by means of an extract from a speech by the company 
founder. The results partially supported Deutsch’s theory in showing an 
effect of culture. Still, the role of fairness for preferred allocation of 
outcomes was not considered, although Deutsch (1975, 1985) stresses the 
link between distributive justice, group goals, and allocation preference. 
The present research is based on two related observations. The first 
observation is that the problems of public good dilemmas are twofold. First, 
people must be motivated to contribute to provide or maintain public goods. 
Second, once provided, the way the benefits should be distributed between 
the members of the collective must be determined. While the first has gained 
considerable attention (e.g., Dawes, 1980; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 
1977; Eek, Biel, & Gärling, 1998; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 
1992; Wilke, 1991), the second has been largely neglected. The second 
observation is that group goals may explain why people allocate public 
goods according to different principles. In a way the present thesis extends 
previous research on fairness in social dilemmas in that the hypothesis that 
people prefer to allocate public goods according to different principles is 
examined. These principles differ in terms of perceived fairness. It is 
proposed that the allocations and the perceived fairness of them depend on 
the particular goal that the group pursues. More specifically, in contrast to 
previous research (e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995, 2000) showing that the 
proportionality principle (i.e., equity) is perceived as fair in public good 
dilemmas, several studies in this thesis demonstrate that other principles 
(i.e., equal treatment, equal final outcomes, and need) are also perceived as 
fair in public good dilemmas insofar as they are conducive to achieving a 
certain induced group goal. In the following, a detailed summary of four 
empirical studies investigating distributive preferences in public good 
dilemmas is provided. 
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Study I: Kazemi, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (2006). Do people prefer 
equity, equality, or equal final outcomes in public good allocations? 
Manuscript submitted for publication.  
 
Study I investigated preferences (according to equity, equality, or equal 
final outcomes) for allocating a public good among group members who had 
contributed unequally in providing the good. In 5-person groups, all 
participants made an initial contribution to a successful provision of the 
public good, and were subsequently told that they randomly had been 
selected as the leader of their group. Their task as the leader was to allocate 
the public good among the other four group members. The question posed in 
Experiment 1 was whether the preferred allocation of the good was 
determined by what is considered to be a fair distribution. Previous research 
shows that the equality principle is chosen because it is considered to be fair 
if social comparison information (i.e., others’ cooperative intentions and 
behavior) is lacking or uncertain (cf. Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl, 1992). 
However, if such information is available, equity or need are perceived as 
fairest (Lamm & Schwinger, 1983; Schwinger & Lamm, 1981; Van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1995). In the study participants were provided with false feedback 
indicating that the other group members’ had contributed unequally. Thus, 
compared to other principles, equality was expected to be perceived as 
unfair. Therefore, it was predicted that participants would prefer to use 
contribution-based allocation principles (i.e., equity and equal final 
outcomes) than equality in their allocations. 
Twenty undergraduates participated. A within-group design was 
employed with allocation principle as a factor with three levels (i.e., equity, 
equality, and equal final outcomes). Participants’ allocations constituted the 
main dependent variable referred to as allocation preference. Following the 
allocation task, participants’ perceived fairness of the different principles 
was measured. 
The results showed that participants took individual contributions to the 
public good into account and expressed a stronger preference for equity and 
equal final outcomes than equality in their allocation decisions. The 
predictions that equality would be perceived as less fair and that it would be 
endorsed less than equity and equal final outcomes were supported. As 
hypothesized, perceived fairness was a significant predictor of preference for 
the equity and equal final outcomes principles. 
Experiment 1 thus provides evidence for the dominant preference of 
two contribution-based allocation principles (i.e., equity and equal final 
outcomes) over equality. When group goal was unspecified, fairness 
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perceptions determined the preferred distribution of the public good. 
Participants did not differentiate between the equity and equal final 
outcomes principles. In Experiment 2 the question of how group goal affects 
preference and perceived fairness of allocation principles was investigated. 
More specifically, by introducing group goal, it was expected that 
participants would differentiate between all principles. It was also expected 
that participants would adopt the equality principle when it was instrumental 
in achieving certain goals (i.e., harmony and enjoyable social relations). This 
implies that equality may be adopted in public good allocations even when 
individual contributions are unequal. 
Sixty undergraduates were randomly assigned to three groups in which 
group goal was varied (economic productivity vs. social concern vs. 
harmony) as a between-groups factor. Apart from this, Experiment 2 was 
identical to Experiment 1. The manipulation of group goal was introduced 
after contributions had been made. In the economic productivity condition 
the instructions read (translated from the Swedish): “Your group has a long-
term goal of economic productivity. Hence, economic profit is the primary 
driving force. The emphasis is on measuring achievements with precision.” 
In the harmony condition the instructions read: “Your group has a long-term 
goal of harmony. Hence, maintenance of enjoyable relations is the primary 
driving force. The emphasis is on enhancing the group spirit and 
fellowship.” In the social concern condition the instructions read: “Your 
group has a long-term goal of social concern. Hence, giving help and 
support to fellow group members is the primary driving force. The emphasis 
is on being considerate and taking responsibility for other members.”  
The results showed that fairness and group goal had independent effects 
on allocation preferences. As predicted, group goal proved to be effective in 
differentiating between the preference for equity and equal final outcomes. 
Equity was preferred among participants who were motivated to realize 
economic productivity, and equal final outcomes among those who pursued 
harmony. Equality was found to be preferred when it was conducive to 
realizing the group goal of social concern. Thus, as hypothesized, when 
contributions are unequal, endorsement of equality may still occur if it is 
directed towards a given group goal. Moreover, Experiment 2 replicated the 
finding that equity and equal final outcomes are perceived as fairer than 
equality, and that their endorsement in allocations correlate with perceived 
fairness.  
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Study II: Kazemi, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (2006). Fairness and group 
goals promote unselfish public good allocations. Manuscript submitted for 
publication.  
 
In Study I participants allocated the public good between others which 
did not make possible an assessment of the role of self-interest. Self-interest 
concerns were addressed in Study II. 
Major and Deaux (1982) distinguished between four different 
allocation paradigms: allocations to others only, allocations to self only, 
individual allocations to self and others, and group allocations to self and 
others. In Experiment 1 a paradigm where participants evaluated allocations 
made by a group leader was employed. The main dependent variable was 
allocation instrumentality, defined as the perception of the different 
distributive principles with regard to their potential in fulfilling certain group 
goals. 
Data were collected for 180 participants in 5-person groups. Group goal 
(economic productivity vs. harmony vs. social concern) was manipulated 
between and allocation principle (equity vs. equality vs. equal final 
outcomes) within groups. In contrast to Study I, one of the other group 
members was appointed as the leader. Group goal was induced in the same 
way as in Study I. Thereafter, the public good dilemma was presented. 
Contribution decisions were followed by an announcement of a decision 
from the group leader regarding the allocation of the public good. 
Participants assessed perceived fairness and instrumentality (e.g., “To what 
extent do you perceive that employing allocation principle X will lead to a 
realization of goal X?”) of this first allocation decision and were informed 
that the experiment was over. Shortly after this, they learned that the leader 
had decided to change the first allocation decision and presented two 
alternative allocations. Participants were then asked to evaluate these 
alternative allocations in terms of fairness and instrumentality. 
The results revealed no significant effects of group goals on perceived 
instrumentality of allocations. Instead, the data clearly indicated that fairness 
predicted instrumentality of allocations. These results may suggest that 
participants in the role of recipients were less concerned with whether or not 
the group goal was realized than participants in the role of leaders in Study I. 
Furthermore, as recipients, participants may not have seen it as their 
responsibility to realize the group goal (cf. Folger, Sheppard, & Buttram, 
1995). 
In Experiment 2 the allocation-to-self-and-others paradigm was 
employed (Major & Deaux, 1982) in which participants were co-recipient 
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allocators of the public good. The issue of responsibility was thus taken into 
account and the role of self-interest for allocations became possible to 
examine directly. Drawing on Deutsch (1975), the hypothesis was that 
preferred allocations and their fairness are affected by the group goal. In 
contrast, self-interest predicts that the allocations depend on the individual’s 
outcome following the allocations (cf. De Dreu, 1996; Messick & Sentis, 
1979). Thus, participants making no contribution (0 unit) or an equal share 
(30 units) contribution would benefit from and therefore prefer equality, 
while those contributing more (40 or 60 units) would benefit from and 
therefore prefer equity. 
Data were collected according to a 4 (Contribution: 0 vs. 30 vs. 40 vs. 
60) × 3 (Group goal: economic productivity vs. harmony vs. social concern) 
× 3 (Allocation principle: equity vs. equality vs. equal final outcomes) 
factorial design with repeated measures on the last two factors. Seventy-two 
participants were told that they belonged to a four-person group. The 
procedure was the same as in the previous experiments except that 
participants were instructed to make seven instead of one contribution 
choice. First, they chose the amount that they preferred most to contribute, 
the second time they chose the second most preferred contribution, and so 
forth. The seventh contribution was thus their least preferred contribution. 
They were told that one of the seven contribution choices would be 
randomly selected as their valid one. In this way the amount of contribution 
to the public good was manipulated between participants. Thereafter, 
participants were given a table with entries showing group members’ initial 
endowments and their possessions after contributions as well as how much 
of the outcome each member would receive according to the three proposed 
allocation principles. Induced group goal was a within-groups factor. 
Following inducement of each goal, participants allocated 240 units between 
themselves and the other members. Subsequent to each allocation, 
participants rated the fairness of the allocation principles. 
Own contribution to the public good (i.e., self-interest) had no 
significant effects on perceived fairness or allocation preferences. In support 
of the predictions, the group goal of economic productivity increased 
fairness of allocations according to equity, and the group goals of harmony 
and social concern increased fairness of allocations according to equality. 
These findings suggest that allocations in public good dilemmas may not 
primarily depend on self-interest but on group goals resulting in a specific 
allocation. 
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Study III: Kazemi, A., Eek, D., & Gärling, T. (2006). The interplay 
between greed, fairness, and group goal in allocation of public goods 
(Göteborg Psychological Reports, 36, No. 2). Sweden: Göteborg University, 
Department of Psychology. 
 
One of the aims of Study III was to examine whether the relationship 
between group goals and allocation preferences extended to asymmetric 
public good dilemmas. As previous studies show that different goals lead to 
different allocation decisions, it was argued in Study III that differences in 
initial endowments should not be crucial for dividing the public good if a 
group goal is made salient. Thus, it was hypothesized that the relationship of 
group goals to allocation preferences generalizes to asymmetric public good 
dilemmas. More specifically, it is hypothesized that equity is preferred when 
the group goal is economic productivity, that equality is preferred when the 
group goal is harmony, and that need is preferred when the group goal is 
social concern.  
Deutsch’s hypothesis regarding the effect of group goal on 
endorsement of the need principle also remains to be validated in public 
good dilemmas. Studies I and II did not address preference for the need 
principle but compared equal final outcomes to equality and equity. By 
asking participants to indicate their need of money for purchasing course 
readings, the principle of need was in Study III operationalized 
independently of participants’ contributions to the public good.  
Another aim was to investigate to what extent participants were driven 
by self-interest by manipulating allocation information. Half of the 
participants learned that their allocations were public (i.e., revealed to others 
in their group), while the other half learned that their allocations would 
remain private. In contrast to the fairness-group goal hypothesis (Deutsch, 
1975, 1985), an alternative self-interest hypothesis (cf. De Dreu, 1996; 
Messick & Sentis, 1979) stresses that people primarily are motivated by 
maximizing their own economic benefits. Thus, on the one hand, if the self-
interest hypothesis is valid, private allocations should result in higher 
allocations to self as compared to public allocations. On the other hand, if 
the fairness-group goal hypothesis is valid, participants should make 
allocations that are instrumental in achieving a certain goal irrespective of 
whether the allocations are private or public. 
The fairness-group goal hypothesis also implies a relationship between 
perceived fairness of allocations and group goals. Previous research (Study 
I; Study II; Mannix et al., 1995) has not provided any explanation for the 
observed relationship between group goals and preferred allocations. Thus, a 
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final purpose was to extend the earlier line of reasoning by examining why 
people striving for a certain goal prefer a specific allocation principle. 
Drawing on prior theoretical and empirical work (Lind & Van den Bos, 
2002; Van Dijk et al., 1999; Wilke, 1991), fairness was assumed to reduce 
uncertainty in choice of allocation strategy to fulfill different goals. Different 
goals activate different fairness norms which in turn govern allocation of 
public goods. Thus, it is hypothesized that the effect of group goal on public 
good allocation is mediated by perceived fairness. 
In 4-person groups, 72 participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions according to a 2 (Endowment position: SEK 60 
[low] vs. SEK 120 [high]) × 2 (Allocation: public vs. private). Participants 
were first asked to indicate their personal need for money to purchase course 
literature the current semester. They were further informed that this 
estimation would be used as a basis for working on the upcoming group 
tasks. This was aimed at providing a basis for the operationalization of the 
need principle, and thereby justifying the asymmetric distribution of 
endowments at the outset of the experiment. Thus, participants were bogusly 
told that those assigned to a high endowment position had indicated a greater 
need than those assigned to a low endowment position. Thus, half of them 
received SEK 60, while the other half received SEK 120. Participants were 
further informed that another group member had received the same amount 
of endowments as they themselves, whereas the other two members had 
received either a lower (i.e., SEK 60) or a higher (i.e., SEK 120) amount. 
The public good dilemma was then presented. After their contribution 
decisions, participants were informed that the public good had been 
provided. A table was given to the participants showing group members’ 
initial endowments, their contribution decisions, their post-contribution 
possessions, and how much each member would receive according to the 
equity, equality, and need principles. Subsequently, group goal was induced 
within groups in the same way as in the previous studies. For each goal, 
participants divided the public good and rated the fairness of each of the 
three principles. 
The results clearly indicated that the relationship of group goal and 
preferred allocations previously observed also holds in asymmetric public 
good dilemmas. Thus, as expected, when the group goal was economic 
productivity, allocations corresponded to equity; when the group goal was 
harmony, allocations corresponded to equality; and when the group goal was 
social concern, allocations corresponded to need. The hypothesis that 
fairness mediates the effects of group goal on allocation preferences was 
also supported, suggesting that perceived fairness explains why people 
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pursuing a certain goal tend to prefer a specific allocation. This finding also 
lends support to the contention that fairness is instrumental in reducing 
uncertainty (cf. Lind & Van den Bos, 2002), pertaining to how to 
accomplish a realization of different group goals by distributing outcomes. 
 
 
Study IV: Kazemi, A., & Eek, D. (in press). Effects of group goal and 
resource valence on allocation preferences in public good dilemmas. Social 
Behavior and Personality: An International Journal. 
 
Social justice research has generated inconclusive results concerning 
the effects of resource valence on fairness perceptions and allocation 
preferences. Furthermore, the question of how to divide losses or negative 
outcomes has not received much attention in social dilemma research. Some 
previous studies show that people prefer equity for allocation of positive 
outcomes and equality for allocation of negative outcomes (e.g., Meeker & 
Elliot, 1987; Törnblom & Jonsson, 1985, 1987), while others show the 
reverse pattern (e.g., Lamm & Kayser, 1978; Mannix et al., 1995; Törnblom 
& Ahlin, 1998; Sondak, Neale, & Pinkley, 1995). In Study IV the issues of 
positive and negative outcome allocations and how people reason about their 
allocations were addressed by adopting the group goal approach. Thus, 
allocation preference variations within each level of resource valence was 
expected to be explained by the extent to which people think that their 
allocations help accomplish a certain group goal. Expressed differently, 
which allocation principle is preferred in the allocation of positive and 
negative outcomes is related to the group goal that the allocation promotes. 
In Experiment 1 it was hypothesized that people bring implicit goals to 
interdependent group situations. Some are performance and productivity 
oriented, others are oriented towards harmony and solidarity, while yet 
others are focused on social responsibility and commitment to the group 
(Deutsch, 1975). The ways people allocate outcomes, positive as well as 
negative, are implicitly affected by the goals that they embrace. An aim was 
therefore to investigate whether the previous results generalize to allocation 
of negative outcomes. 
In contrast to the previous studies, group goal was not manipulated but 
measured. Specifically, the extent to which participants believed that their 
allocations promoted realization of several different group goals was 
measured. Thus, by measuring several different group goals, factor analysis 
could be used to examine the dimensionality of the group goal construct, 
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hence testing the validity of the assumed three-dimensionality (Deutsch, 
1975).  
A total of 100 participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups where resource valence was either positive or negative. As in Study 
III, participants were instructed to indicate their personal need for money to 
purchase course literature the current semester and were bogusly told that 
those assigned to a high-endowment position had indicated a greater need 
than those assigned to a low-endowment position. In reality, all participants 
were assigned to the low-endowment position. After participants had made 
their contribution decisions, resource valence was manipulated. Half was 
told that the provision threshold was not reached (i.e., the deficit condition), 
whereas the other half was told that the provision threshold was outreached 
(i.e., the surplus condition). In both groups, the distance to the provision 
threshold was said to be SEK 600. Subsequently, all participants were asked 
to divide the deficit (or surplus) between themselves and fellow group 
members. In the surplus condition, participants were told that in spite of the 
initial information that contributions beyond the threshold would not be 
given back to group members, the experimenter had now decided to do so. 
In the deficit condition, participants were told the experimenter had decided 
to give the group another chance to provide the public good. 
Subsequent to the allocation task, participants assessed perceived 
fairness of the allocation principles of equity, equality, and need as in 
previous studies. Following this, the extent to which participants believed 
that their allocations promoted realization of different group goals was 
measured.  
Factor analysis showed that a two-factor solution of the group goal 
construct provided the most parsimonious description of the data. 
Furthermore, as predicted for allocation of positive outcomes (i.e., surplus), 
it was found that relationship-oriented goals predicted preferences for the 
allocation principle of equality, whereas performance-oriented goals 
predicted preferences for the allocation principle of equity. The same held 
true for allocation of negative outcomes. This lends support to Törnblom 
(1988) who suggested that under task-oriented group orientation, the equity 
principle is favored for distribution of both positive and negative outcomes, 
and under socio-emotional group orientation, the equality principle is 
favored for distribution of both positive and negative outcomes. This 
suggests that people implicitly have different orientations or goals in mind in 
group situations that influence the way they prefer to allocate positive as 
well as negative outcomes. 
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Experiment 1 also showed that participants allocating deficits deviated 
to a larger extent from the allocation principles of equity, equality, and need 
than did participants allocating surpluses. Experiment 2 further investigated 
this finding. 
In Experiment 2 participants’ own contribution was kept constant 
(equal share, SEK 500) in a scenario which yielded identical allotted shares 
to the participants. This was done to exclude a possible source of 
confounding in Experiment 1 (i.e., that participants gained differential shares 
from the presented allocation principles). Furthermore, it was hypothesized 
that participants dividing a deficit would conceive the division as more 
difficult than participants dividing a surplus (cf. Mannix et al., 1995; Sondak 
et al., 1995).  
Eighty non-psychology undergraduates participated in Experiment 2. 
Equal numbers of participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions (resource valence: positive vs. negative). Responses 
to questionnaire items were solicited after regular class meetings. All 
participants were instructed to imagine that they belonged to a group 
consisting of four members. The public good dilemma was described in the 
same way as in Experiment 1 except for that participants were told that all 
group members were endowed with the same amount of money (i.e., 
symmetric endowment positions), and that participants were not informed 
about the level of the provision threshold. More specifically, they were told 
that the provision threshold would be randomly chosen within an interval of 
SEK 1400 and SEK 2600. The sum of contributions was kept constant (i.e., 
SEK 2000) across the resource valence conditions. Thus, participants in the 
negative resource valence condition imagined that the provision threshold 
was randomly chosen to be SEK 2600, resulting in a deficit of SEK 600, 
whereas participants in the positive resource valence condition imagined that 
the provision threshold was randomly chosen to be SEK 1400, resulting in a 
surplus of SEK 600. Subsequently, all participants were asked to divide SEK 
600 between themselves and fellow group members. Thus, as in Experiment 
1, one half divided a deficit while the other divided a surplus. All 
participants were also asked to imagine that they had contributed SEK 500. 
Subsequently, the relative easiness/difficulty of allocations with opposite 
sign was assessed. 
The finding in Experiment 1 that participants deviated more from the 
principles of equity and equality in the negative than in the positive resource 
valence condition was replicated. Results also showed that allocation of 
positive outcomes was perceived as easier than allocation of negative 
outcomes, suggesting that people allocating negative outcomes may 
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experience a lower level of confidence in their allocations, thus the larger 
deviations from the allocation principles in negative outcome allocations. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In Study I, the results of Experiment 1 clearly demonstrated that 
participants took individual contributions to the public good into account in 
determining what constitutes a fair distribution. Based on the observation 
that participants did not allocate the public good in accordance with the 
equality norm, it is concluded that individual contributions and post-
contribution possessions are important for allocation decisions. It is also 
concluded that participants’ allocation preferences were guided by fairness 
perceptions. In Experiment 2, participants’ allocation preferences were 
affected by the induced group goal. Thus, preferred distribution of public 
goods may not primarily depend on what contributions have been made but 
on implied future goals such as harmony, justifying equal final outcomes.  
One limitation of using the symmetric public good dilemma paradigm 
is that the principle of need becomes difficult to operationalize. In the 
experiments, need was defined on the basis of participants’ post-contribution 
possessions. The need principle becomes in this way a hybrid of the equity 
principle (in the sense that people get more the more they contribute) and the 
equality principle (in the sense that people end up with the same amount of 
resources). Therefore, this might provide an alternative explanation of the 
data in that the principles of equality and need in their relation to the group 
goals of harmony and social concern crossed over relative to the predictions 
in Study I. 
In Study II the effects of perceived fairness, group goal, and 
cooperation (i.e., self-interest) on choice of principles for distributing public 
goods were investigated. Two different allocation paradigms were used. 
Experiment 1, in which participants merely acted as recipients and evaluated 
allocations by a group leader, revealed only an effect of perceived fairness 
on allocation instrumentality. Group goal and cooperation had no effects. A 
plausible explanation for the observation that fairness affected perceived 
instrumentality of allocations, but not group goal, may be related to the fact 
that for participants in the role of recipients fairness was more salient and 
thus more important to achieve than group goals. Moreover, since 
participants only evaluated allocations by a group leader and thus had no 
control over the distributions in Experiment 1, it may be argued that they did 
not see as their responsibility to realize the group goals (e.g., Folger, 
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Sheppard, & Buttram, 1995). The issue of responsibility was taken into 
account in designing Experiment 2 in that an allocation-to-self-and-others 
paradigm was employed (Major & Deaux, 1982) to make participants 
responsible for group goal attainment, and to address the role of self-interest 
for allocations more directly. The results of Experiment 2 corroborated the 
line of reasoning in showing that self-interest had no significant effects on 
perceived fairness or allocation preferences. Lending support to the 
predictions, the group goal of economic productivity increased fairness of 
equitable allocations and the group goals of harmony and social concern 
increased fairness of equal allocations. 
In a sense it can be argued that fairness concerns and group goal 
inducement promoted unselfish allocation of public goods in Study II (but 
also in Study III to be discussed in the following paragraphs). These findings 
support Wilke’s (1991) GEF hypothesis implying that greed is restrained by 
fairness and efficiency motives. Efficiency generalized to allocation 
preferences in the present context may refer to that participants attempt to 
realize implied future group goals by choosing different strategies to 
distribute the public good among themselves. 
An important question not addressed in Studies I and II concerned how 
endowment asymmetry may moderate the effects of group goal on preferred 
allocations. By using an asymmetric paradigm the need principle was 
operationalized based on initial asymmetric endowment positions instead of 
post-contribution possessions, which proved useful in disentangling the 
principle of need from the principle of equal final outcomes, thus addressing 
an important shortcoming in Studies I and II. Study III provided evidence for 
similar effects of group goal on preferred allocations in asymmetric public 
good dilemmas, suggesting that participants in the low-endowment position 
endorsed allocation strategies that were conducive to realizing a certain 
group goal in the same way that participants in the high-endowment position 
did. More importantly, it was demonstrated that fairness mediates the effect 
of group goal on allocation preferences, suggesting that perceived fairness 
explains why people pursuing a certain goal tend to prefer a specific 
allocation strategy.  
Another important aspect of Study III is related to the observation that 
no significant effects of allocation information (i.e., self-interest) on 
preferred allocations were found. That is, being informed that allocations 
would remain private did not incur higher self-allocations than being 
informed that allocations would be public. This result replicates the findings 
of Study II, in which participants’ contributions to a public good (i.e., self-
interest) did not affect choice of allocation strategy. In Study III the 
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proposed relationship between group goal and allocation preference was not 
dependent on whether the allocations were said to be public or private. This 
implies that the group goal, not social desirability or self-presentational 
motives, affects the allocation preferences. Specifically, if a social 
desirability or self-presentational motive would underlie participants’ 
allocation decisions, one should expect to observe a link between group 
goals and preferred allocations only when the allocations were said to be 
public. 
In conclusion, the present results corroborate the theoretical reasoning 
that preferred allocations of common resources depend on group goal 
(Deutsch, 1975, 1985). This finding is consistent with previous research 
showing that decision frames influence the way people behave in social 
dilemmas (e.g., Pillutla & Chen, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  
In Study IV, the effects of group goal on preferred allocations were 
generalized to distribution of negative outcomes. It was noted that previous 
research had generated inconclusive results on whether allocation of 
negative and positive outcomes are guided by the same or different 
allocation norms. Thus, in Experiment 1, it was argued that group goal 
accounts for variations in allocation preferences within each level of 
resource valence. In support of this, group goal accounted for preferred 
allocation of positive and negative outcomes in a similar way. In contrast to 
Studies I, II, and III, group goal was not manipulated but measured. Thus, 
the dimensionality of group goal was empirically assessed, but also potential 
effects of demand characteristic resulting from manipulation of group goal 
were reduced in this way. A two-dimensional structure of group goal was 
supported (i.e., performance- and relationship-oriented group goals). Larger 
deviations from all principles for allocating negative outcomes, which was 
observed in Experiment 1, were further investigated in Experiment 2. As 
hypothesized, Experiment 2 showed that allocations of negative outcomes 
are perceived as more difficult than allocations of positive outcomes. This 
lends support to Mannix et al. (1995) who suggested that people are less 
experienced and thus less confident in dividing losses and consequently find 
division of losses as more difficult than division of gains. 
A methodological issue that applies to all four studies in this thesis 
concerns the measurement of fairness perceptions of allocation principles 
after participants’ allocations and then using fairness perceptions as a 
predictor of preferred allocation. Thus, the temporal order between the 
dependent and the independent variable is reversed in this case. However, 
measurements of fairness perceptions after participants’ allocations need not 
have any bearing on the conclusion that fairness affects public good 
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allocation. The argument for the employed strategy was to prevent making 
fairness perceptions salient to participants before they made their allocations 
(cf. Eek et al., 1998). 
What are the implications and extensions of the present findings? In 
order to survive and prosper, every organized group must first adapt to the 
external environment surrounding it, and second, maintain cohesion and 
prevent the group from disintegration. Preventing disintegration is largely 
dependent on the extent to which the group manages to attain various 
collective goals. These goals have to do with retaining the members by 
attending to their personal welfare as well as maintaining harmonious 
relations among them to fulfill personal and group needs. However, to 
ensure its existence the group has to produce efficiently, otherwise it cannot 
compete and eventually it will be dissolved (Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 
1992). A basic proposition in this thesis has been that different group goals 
can be attained by using different principles of allocation (Deutsch, 1975, 
1985).  Allocation of resources takes place in all social settings. In an 
allocation event, the individual sometimes is the allocator. At other times, he 
or she is the recipient. The individual may also in certain cases be a co-
recipient allocator of a particular resource. In any case, a number of 
psychological and situational factors affect the individual’s decisions. In this 
thesis, the emphasis has been on investigating the role of group goal for 
allocators’, recipients’, and co-recipient allocators’ distributive preferences 
in social dilemmas. Some goals are certainly more salient than others in 
certain contexts. Austin (1980) reported that whereas college roommates 
allocating a group resource disregarded individual differences in 
performance resulting in equal allocations, strangers focused on individual 
differences in performance resulting in equitable allocations. Similarly, Eek 
et al. (2001) showed that equitable distributions of child care were 
considered as fairer than equal distributions when it was provided by private 
institutes, whereas equal distributions were considered as fairer when child 
care was provided by the municipality. As collectives such as municipalities 
and a group of roommates probably are more concerned with promoting 
relationship-oriented than performance-oriented goals, these findings are 
consistent with those presented in this thesis concerning the relationship 
between group goal and allocation preference. An implication of these 
findings is that endorsement of a certain allocation principle is justified and 
accepted in one context or organizational culture but not in another (cf. 
Mannix et al., 1995). 
Salience of different goals depends on a group’s development phase or 
the social situation it is facing. For instance, sororities or fraternities, which 
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in Deutsch’s (1975) terms are “solidarity-oriented groups,” do not always 
prefer equal resource distributions or consider such distributions as fair. 
Goode (1978) challenged Deutsch’s view that social groups, depending on 
their goal orientation, prefer a single dominant distributive justice principle. 
Instead, he suggested that different principles apply to different phases or 
occasions in a group’s life rather than one principle always being dominant 
for a group. Highlighting the moderating role of social relationship, 
Törnblom (1992) objected to Deutsch’s unconditional propositions by noting 
that “it seems gratuitous to claim that the shouldering of responsibility for a 
recipient’s welfare would elicit need-oriented allocations. Of course this 
may depend on whose needs are recognized (e.g., those of a child or 
prisoner) and on the nature of the allocator’s responsibilities (e.g., those of a 
parent or a prison guard)” (p. 214). This comment underscores the 
importance of type of social relationship between the interacting individuals 
in deciding whether a certain allocation principle is conducive to achieving a 
certain group goal. Thus, in real-life settings there is usually a mixture of 
different goals at some point in time which makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to adhere to one principle only.  
At this point, it is relevant to call attention to and summarize the 
contributions of the present thesis to social dilemma research. One 
contribution is that the present research highlights and remedies two 
limitations of the public good dilemma paradigm in previous research. In 
contrast to the traditional public good paradigm (e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 
1995), degree of uncertainty about how the public good would be distributed 
is introduced here. Thus, when deciding how much to contribute, 
participants were not certain about how much they would benefit from the 
public good should it be provided. In real-life public good dilemmas, people 
are seldom certain about how public goods will be distributed. To exemplify, 
when citizens pay taxes they are uncertain about how the accumulated tax 
pool will be allocated. Thus, each citizen knows that he or she will receive 
something but not how much. Another real-life example is the so-called 
covered-dish supper where the guests are expected to bring their own food 
and then share it with the others. Again, how the food pool is going to be 
divided between the guests are not known. Despite the fact that the division 
of the public good is unknown in these cases there is room for self-interest. 
Furthermore, the public good dilemma paradigm was extended in Study I to 
allow other principles than equality to be applied in the allocation of public 
goods. Participants were told that they as leaders would not receive anything 
from the public good. Hence, non-excludability did not apply in the 
allocation of the public good. However, it is argued that this public good 
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simulation comes closer to real life than those used in previous research. For 
example, contributing to charities is often given as an example of a public 
good dilemma (e.g., Cornes & Sandler, 1996). Yet, it is clear that non-
excludability does not apply in this case as there is usually a person or a 
group who determines how the charitable resources are allocated to others. 
Another aspect of non-excludability concerns whether public goods in real 
life are public in the sense that they are accessible to all people. As Foddy 
(2005) argues, excluding or restricting people’s access to scarce public 
goods is a common structural solution that governmental agencies apply. 
That is, public goods are provided only for some “publics” or “groups” that 
in various ways meet some requirements for deriving benefits from the 
public good. Foddy concluded that the publics who contribute to the 
provision and the publics who benefit from its provision vary. Furthermore, 
as noted by Messick (1995), equal distributions of public goods are not 
always feasible as some resources cannot fully be divided equally. For 
instance, it is easier to accomplish an equal division of a continuous resource 
(e.g., money) than a non-continuous one (e.g., carpet). Thus, real-life public 
goods cannot always be allocated equally because “public” does not mean 
“accessible to all people” (Foddy, 2005) and because public goods differ 
with regard to the properties of the resource that constitutes them (Messick, 
1995). Taken together, the present research contributes to experimental 
public good dilemma research in that a paradigm was developed which 
mimics real-life public goods in a way that has not been recognized in past 
research. 
Besides the development of a new public good dilemma paradigm 
outlined above, the present research argued that public good dilemmas can 
be decomposed into provision and allocation of public goods. Stressing the 
latter, this thesis conceptualized cooperation broader than traditionally. 
Specifically, cooperation was studied in terms of allocating public goods to 
attain group goals favoring the collective interest. Introduction of the notion 
of group goal extended the notion of collective interest in social dilemmas. 
The group goal concept and multiple norms of fairness highlighted the role 
of non-economic incentives for allocation preferences, providing support for 
the notion that people’s group behavior is not solely motivated by self-
interest. Thus, the role of self-interest for allocation decisions when group 
goals are activated was addressed. Four- and five-person groups, as opposed 
to dyads in earlier research (e.g., Deutsch, 1985, 1987), in an experimental 
public good dilemma paradigm with a clear incentive structure, instead of a 
scenario method (e.g., Mannix et al., 1995), were used to study allocation 
preferences. This is clearly a more valid way of addressing the role of self-
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interest. Moreover, two different operationalizations of the need principle 
(i.e., in terms of post-contribution possessions and in terms of lack of 
resource beyond the individual’s control) were utilized. This is an important 
contribution of this thesis as the principle of need as compared to the 
principles of equity and equality has received scant attention in previous 
research (Deutsch, 1985; Eckhoff, 1974; Messick & Sentis, 1983; Törnblom, 
1992). Furthermore, it was shown that the effects of group goal on public 
good allocations generalize to situations in which the interacting individuals 
have differential initial assets. This suggests that once people are motivated 
to attain collective goals, they pay less attention to how much each group 
member possesses initially or after contributions to the public good if such 
concerns are not perceived as conducive to realization of a particular goal 
(cf. Tyler, 2005). It was also shown that fairness may explain why pursuit of 
a certain group goal results in preference for a particular allocation principle. 
Additionally, it was demonstrated that group goal accounts for variations in 
allocation preferences for positive and negative outcomes, suggesting that 
negative and positive outcomes are allocated according to the same 
principles if they promote a specific group goal. Furthermore, effects of 
group goal on preferred allocations were validated using two different 
methodologies, that is, experimental manipulations and survey 
measurements. In conclusion, as group goals and resource allocation are 
integral parts of all social groups, knowledge in advance of how to distribute 
group resources to realize different collective goals are essential to an 
understanding of group functioning and effectiveness.  
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